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DISCUSSION:

BEATTY ON CHANCE AND NATURAL SELECTION*
TIMOTHY SHANAHAN
Department of Philosophy
Loyola Marymount University

In his (1984) John Beatty correctly identifies the issue of the role of chance
in evolution as one of the liveliest disputes in evolutionary biology. He argues,
on the basis of a carefully articulated example, that "Even on a proper construal

of 'natural selection', it is difficult to distinguish between the 'improbable results
of natural selection' and evolution by random drift". His other remarks indicate
that he is thinking of conceptual as well as practical indistinguishability. In this
discussion I take issue with one of the consequences Beatty draws from his
example. I argue that the example at most shows that the effects of drift and
selection are sometimes difficult to separate in practice, but that the stronger
conceptual claim is not warranted. The deeper problems raised by the example
are seen to demand causal, rather then conceptual, analysis.

In his (1984) John Beatty explicates the relationship between chance
and natural selection in evolutionary theory. He rejects the widespread
view that the fitness of an organism is simply that organism's actual re-

productive success, because this renders the distinction between random

genetic drift and natural selection opaque. Instead he expresses his preference for a propensity interpretation according to which: "[T]he fitness
of an organism is the number of offspring it is physically disposed to
contribute in a particularly specified environment' (p. 192; compare Mills

and Beatty 1979). On this interpretation natural selection could be understood as sampling on the basis of such fitness differences, and random
drift as sampling irrespective of such fitness differences. An apparent

virtue of this approach is that the somewhat nebulous question of the roles
of chance and natural selection in evolution could then be stated more

perspicuously as "the question of the relative evolutionary importance of

sampling without regard to fitness differences vs. sampling with regard
to fitness differences" (pp. 190-191).
Beatty favors the propensity interpretation over the common, but erroneous, view of fitness because the latter view manifestly fails, in every

case, to distinguish drift and selection. Following the above considerations, however, he adds: "But I am afraid that, as much as I would like
*Received February 1987; revised June 1987.
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the distinction between natural selection and random drift to be a clearcut one, it is not as clear-cut as the preceding discussion suggests" (p.
192). Even on the propensity interpretation, it seems, there will be some
cases in which drift and selection are indistinguishable, namely, where
the results of natural selection, if such they be, are not what we would
expect. He gives the following example to support his claim that: "Even
on a proper construal of 'natural selection', it is difficult to distinguish
between the 'improbable results of natural selection' and evolution by
random drift" (p. 183). We are to imagine two kinds of moths, light and
dark, which live in a forest in which 40% of the trees have light-colored
bark, and 60% of the trees have dark-colored bark. In addition there are
in the forest color-sensitive predators which prey on the moths. We would
expect, ceteris paribus, that in such an environment the dark-colored moths

would be fitter, since the forest as a whole affords them more protection
from predators than it does for their light-colored neighbors.
So far so good. But suppose, Beatty goes on, that in one particular
generation we discover that a greater proportion of dark moths than was

characteristic of the population as a whole, and similarly a smaller proportion of light-colored moths, were killed by predation. Suppose also
that we have evidence that the dark moths were perched on light trees
when attacked, and the light moths were perched on dark trees. Although

the percentage of dark trees is greater than the percentage of light trees,
the dark moths landed on the light trees more often.
This is the example. Beatty then raises the following question: "Is the

change in frequency of genes and genotypes in question a matter of natural selection, or a matter of random drift?" Given the definitions of nat-

ural selection and drift introduced earlier, this question can be reformulated: "[I]s the change in question the result of sampling discriminately

or indiscriminately with regard to fitness differences?" (p. 195). He sees

a problem in answering this question unambiguously. On the one hand,
it is difficult to maintain that the predation of dark moths on light trees
is indiscriminate sampling. After all, such moths presumably are dead

because they were too conspicuous to predators. "On the other hand,"
he says, "it is also difficult to maintain that selection alone is the basis
of the change. At least, it is difficult to maintain that the fittest were
selected" (pp. 195-196). He concludes from this example that
it seems that we must say of some evolutionary changes that they are

to some extent, or in some sense, a matter of natural selection and
to some extent, or in some sense, a matter of random drift. And the
reason (one of the reasons) we must say this is that it is conceptually
difficult to distinguish natural selection from random drift, especially
where improbable results of natural selection are concerned. (p. 196)
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Beatty's argument, if sound, would be interesting because of its implications for the structure of evolutionary theory in which selection and
drift are understood to be conceptually distinct, but interacting, forces.
On the other hand, if the moth example shows only that the two processes
are practically difficult to distinguish in some cases, then it merely illustrates a fact that biologists are only too aware of already. This example,
therefore, deserves closer examination.
Beatty locates the difficulty in the moth example as that of distinguishing between natural selection and drift, since each possibility seems prob-

lematic. He doesn't say why it is difficult to maintain that selection alone
was the basis of the change, but presumably he has in mind the fact that
the dark moths are fitter than the light moths with respect to their predominantly dark forest home, so they couldn't have been discriminated
against on the basis of fitness differences, which were clearly in their
favor.

But is this analysis correct? It depends, of course, on what we take to
be the relevant environment of the dark moths that were killed. Is it the
forest that contains a certain percentage of dark and light trees, or is it

the light tree each ill-fated dark moth was perched upon when it was
killed? A dark moth may be fitter than a light moth with respect to a

forest containing more dark trees than light trees, but if we take a smaller
unit for our reference environment, for example, the particular tree each
moth is perched upon, then those same dark moths may be less fit with
respect to that environment than the light moths are. In other words, the
identification of the relevant environment becomes crucial for the as-

signment of fitness values, and consequently for the determination, in any
given sampling event, of the roles of drift and selection.

The problem of identifying the relevant environment, while often difficult, is not obviously a conceptual problem but rather involves the difficulty of correctly isolating and weighting the causal factors connecting

various environmental properties to an organism's survival and reproduction. The precise details of how this is to be done are at present fuzzy,
but the general outline of a solution can be sketched. (An anonymous
referee for this journal informs me that Robert Brandon has interesting
work in progress on this problem. I'm afraid that here I can only muddle

along with the admittedly rather rough-hewn analysis that follows. Read-

ers are, of course, invited to improve upon it.)
For purposes of precise evolutionary explanation we should include in

our analysis the most fine-grained environment in which the properties
of interest actually play a causal role in the survival and reproduction of
that organism. Because of the immediacy of some environments to an
organism's survival and reproductive interests, such environments will

generally play a relatively more important role in our analysis of that
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organism's fitness than will wider, more inclusive environments. This
principle does not exclude consideration of patchy environments-on the
contrary, the greater an organism's ability to discriminate and take advantage of uneven environments, the more weight must be assigned to

that environment in contributing to an organism's fitness. Indeed, we can
think of each organism as belonging to an indefinite variety of environments which overlap to various degrees; the environmental component of

its "absolute fitness" is a function of all of these, weighted in an inverse
proportion to each environment's importance at the moment. Thus the

fitness of an organism changes, as its relationships to various environments change, through time. As if this weren't daunting enough, the fact

that other highly mobile organisms constitute part of the environment of
most organisms makes the prospects of determining "the" fitness of any

organism at a specified time staggering to contemplate. (It should be noted
that speaking of the fitness of genotypes, rather than of organisms, doesn't
help, since the fitness of a genotype is just the average of the fitnesses
of the organisms possessing that genotype.)
Fortunately, however, the determination of the (absolute) fitness of an

organism is rarely if ever necessary, since such "overall fitness", as such,
plays no causal role in an organism's survival and reproduction (Sober
1984). What matters is, rather, the causally salient features of its envi-

ronment, which do in fact affect its survival or reproductive success. This

can be seen by returning to the moth example. There is certainly no conceptual difficulty in thinking that the dark moths that were killed while
perched on light trees were discriminated against on the basis of their

lower fitness in virtue of their relationship to that particular environment.
Given the scenario as it is presented, the particular light-colored trees the

dark moths were perched upon, as well as the color-sensitive predators,
constitute the primary causal factors in that sampling event. These fac-

tors, in effect, "screen off" less relevant causal factors (such as the patchiness of the forest as a whole) from the moths' survival and reproductive
success. (Compare Salmon (1984) on the notion of screening-off. Brandon (1982) shows how this notion can be fruitfully applied to biological
analysis.) Their overall fitness, determined in part by the patchy forest
home they inhabit, is in this case causally irrelevant. (Why these particular moths lit on light-barked trees when dark-barked trees are more com-

mon is an interesting, but strictly different, question. See below.) This
is not to deny the causal relevance of more inclusive environments in the

entire life history of an organism, but is meant to distinguish components
of fitness which are, or are not, relevant to the analysis of a given change
in gene frequencies. Beatty is right to index the fitness of an organism
to a specific environment, since this is the causally significant consideration. But because he fails to adequately consider the causal role of the
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micro-environment (the individual trees) of the organisms in question, his

analysis quite literally risks missing the trees for the forest.
Another part of the apparent conceptual difficulty in Beatty's example
may result simply from a foreshortened perspective. The identification of

evolutionary forces must usually be inferred indirectly from trends over
several generations back to their environmental and genetic causes. The
example concerns a change in gene frequency within a single generation.
In this case we have no way of telling whether the moths just happened
to land on the trees they did, or whether they landed on those trees because of some genetically influenced disposition. A study of this popu-

lation of moths over several generations might disclose whether this behavior was a recurrent one, and thus indicative of a genetic basis for the
behavior. Of course, merely observing either a uni-directional or a com-

pletely random change in gene frequencies in the moths over several generations would not suffice to prove that the changes were due to selection
rather than to drift, or vice versa, any more than obtaining all heads upon
flipping a coin a large (or even infinite) number of times proves that the
coin is biased (van Fraassen 1977). The point here is just that in the
absence of detailed knowledge of the relevant causal factors responsible

for an evolutionary pattern, even one spanning many generations, we cannot infallibly identify the evolutionary forces responsible for changes in

gene frequencies. This problem is of course magnified if we are dealing,
as in Beatty's example, with just a single generation. I suspect that the
appearance of a conceptual difficulty stems in part from the very real
practical difficulty of correctly analyzing the moth example in the absence

of the necessary causal information, not from any essential conceptual
indistinguishability between drift and natural selection.
The primary thesis of this discussion should already be tolerably clear
from the foregoing remarks, but it can now be made explicit. Beatty con-

siders the problem posed by the moth example to be, at least in part, a

conceptual one. But this risks confusing our inability in some cases to
identify the relative values of the evolutionary processes at work with the

difficulty of clearly stating the differences between these processes. The
question raised by the moth example is not whether drift and selection

are conceptually difficult to distinguish-they are not. Rather, the moth
example raises the question of how we are to individuate environments

for, and make valid inferences from evolutionary patterns to, the determination of causally relevant properties responsible for fitness differences

and changes in gene frequencies. Hence, the problem is one of detailed

causal, rather than conceptual, analysis. The moral to be drawn from
Beatty's paper and the present discussion, therefore, is the necessity of
supplementing the study of evolutionary phenomena with the detailed
analysis of the causal factors responsible for those phenomena.
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